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An agent-based model in which economic exchange and military conflict are emergent processes is used 
to explore the relationship between trade and war. The model of exchange is an applied analysis of the eco-
nomics of trading networks. The model of conflict treats war as a breakdown in interstate bargaining due to 
incomplete information. The simulations explore how initial economic geography, state revisionism, defen-
sive advantage, and technological advancement akin to globalization affect both trade and war. The results 
show that the relationship between trade and war depends on third factors, and an inverse relationship 
between trade and war emerges from compact geographies with revisionist states. 
What is the relationship between international trade and war? Liberal scholars, such 
as Rosecrance (1986), Doyle (1986), Oneal et al. (1996), and Oneal and Russett (1997), 
generally posit an inverse relationship between international trade and war because 
trade links may create a disincentive to engage in military conflict. Realist scholars 
sometimes hypothesize a positive relationship; Liberman (1996) argues that military 
conquest remains a potentially efficient way to acquire resources, and Hoffman (1963) 
shows that increased economic interactions may actually sow the seeds of conflict by 
creating dependent economjc relationships described by Waltz (1970). Others, such as 
Buzan (1984), argue that there should be no real correlation at all between trade and 
war because the origins of trade are different from the causes of war. I 
In examining the empirical implications of this debate, scholars have employed a 
limited set of tools, often using statistical analyses that are not based on an underlying 
1. Good recent surveys of this broad literature can be found in McMillan (1997) and Mansfield and 
Poll ins (2001). 
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structural model. One problem with econometric inference is that the observed history 
of the world has actually run along only one particular path. Different trade networks 
and patterns of military conflict could well have emerged from seemingly random 
decisions and small changes in initial conditions—a key insight from the new wave of 
counterfactual analysis including Tetlock and Belkin’s (1996) volume. Another prob­
lem is that such statistical models force one to treat either trade or war as an exogenous 
variable. This perspective may lose the insight that trade and war are both endogenous 
processes. Neither is outside the international system; indeed, each may be an emer­
gent property within a system of states motivated to increase their resources and 
power. 
Understanding that trade and war are both endogenous leads us to consider whether 
the relationship between economic exchange and military conflict may be governed by 
third factors. Two quick examples will help illustrate this point. Closer economic 
geography makes the growth of trading networks possible, but it can also render mili­
tary conquest and the subsequent extraction of resources easier to achieve. Features of 
economic geography that facilitate trade, such as roads, bridges, and railways, can 
similarly be used for troop movements and resource extraction. Likewise, the impulse 
leading unitary states to invest in trade relationships with other states, namely the 
desire to acquire other states’ resources—often called economic revisionism—is 
related to the motivation leading them to consider war. Revisionist states can improve 
their position within the international system through both war and trade, which, for 
example, may account for the distrust of some Western political leaders about China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization. 
Scholars who model trade and war have long understood that external factors, such 
as economic geography, matter; it is now commonplace to include measures of dis­
tance in gravity models of trade and also to consider contiguity terms in models of 
interstate military conflict. Still, these terms function only as very crude approxima­
tions of economic geography. We agree with Gleditsch and Ward (2000, 6) who state, 
“The role of geography has been widely ignored.” Our measure of economic geogra­
phy accounts for both physical geography and economic infrastructure. Because of 
varying natural features, different regions in the international system have idiosyn­
cratic economic geographies and disparately shaped trading networks. The economic 
geography in Western Europe is relatively compact compared with the distended 
geography in South America; this difference may help to account for the historically 
high levels of both trade and war within the former. 
Revisionism can be defined as the desire of certain states in the international system 
to acquire additional power, which is usually measured in terms of material resources. 
Traditional realist scholars such as Morgenthau (1948) and Schweller (1994) often 
identify revisionism as an important source of military conflict. Scholarship on trade 
and war has neglected the role of revisionism in generating economic exchange; 
indeed, it is worth exploring in detail how a state’s impulse to acquire resources can 
affect both war and trade. An important contribution of our work is that we offer an 
analytically cogent measure of state revisionism using a simple measure of the elastic­
ity of substitution. The Armington aggregator common in empirical studies of interna­
tional trade implies that a highly revisionist state has strong economies of scope. If 
such a state obtains a diverse resource base, it will achieve a large increase in military 
power. 
We use an agent-based model that treats trade and war as emergent processes in a 
system of states. This model allows us in essence to “rerun history,” examining the 
impact of random events and changes in initial conditions. Configured in different ini­
tial economic geographies, the states begin in autarky, and each is endowed with a 
unique tradable good. A state begins to trade with another state if it can pay the fixed 
cost of opening and maintaining commercial relations. A state may also demand 
resources from another state; as a result of these threats, costly wars may occur. 
This model is novel in its treatment of both trade and war. Emphasizing that trade is 
not just a bilateral phenomenon, the model functions as an applied theoretical analysis 
of the economics of trading networks. One key feature is the trade-off between the 
fixed costs of setting up and maintaining trade links and the benefits of increased diver­
sity in consumption. These fixed costs are endogenous; thus, in an important sense, the 
evolution of the economic geography is an emergent property of the opportunities for 
exchange.2 Trading networks arise spontaneously and have an ambiguous effect on the 
likelihood of conflict. For example, we show that a state will not go to war with another 
state that is fully integrated into its trading group, but it will fight with a near neighbor 
that is part of a complementary group. Indeed, the potential gains from conflict will be 
higher if the defending state has many different trading partners and thus a rich array of 
new goods available for usurpation. 
Although there have been several notable agent-based computer models of war,3 
our work also represents one of the first efforts to apply the insights of formal theorists 
such as Fearon (1995) and Morrow (1989), who argue that war tends to result from a 
breakdown of interstate bargaining due to incomplete information. In our model, when 
a state makes a demand for resources, it cannot know whether it faces a weak or strong 
defender. Weak defenders generally capitulate to all but the most extreme demands, 
but war will occur when a state demands resources from a committed defender who 
resists the threat. Wars thus occur randomly, as in Gartzke’s (1999) model. 
The remainder of the article is organized into four sections. The second section 
describes the model. The third investigates some of its analytical properties. The 
fourth section reports the simulation results that are the empirical heart of the model. 
The fifth section concludes. 
THE MODEL 
The world consists of m states. Each state is endowed at time t with an idiosyncratic 
good ωi(t), and the list of states is the index set i ∈ M = {1, . . . ,m}. A state’s endowment 
2. One can think of the current economic geography of the world system as an evolving state variable. 
The initial economic geography is clearly exogenous. A good survey of the recent theoretical developments 
in economic geography is that of Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999). Almost all this literature focuses on 
very simple, static, spatial environments. 
3. Epstein and Axtell (1996), Cederman (1994), Cusack and Stoll (1990), and Bremer and Mihalka 
(1977) are examples. 
� 
depends on time because a state that loses a war suffers a diminution of its economic 
resources. Also, because each state has its own good, there is a simple relationship 
between patterns of trade and the structure of demand in the world economy. We are 
using the analytical artifice of a state-specific composite commodity to capture the 
notion that every state has comparative advantage in some good. 
Each state has preferences that are summarized by a utility function, ui : R+ 
m → R, 
whose rule ui(x) also serves as the foundation for an expected utility indicator. For ana­
lytical simplicity, we assume that each state is risk neutral, and we impose further that 
m 
ρ i	 (1) ρ  1 iu x  = ∑ x , 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ,i( ) 	   k  i 1  k =1  
where xk is the kth component of the vector x. Thus, states have identical homothetic 
preferences, and each state values every good in the world economy. 
The parameter ρi merits some discussion. As ρi tends toward zero, the ith state 
becomes more desirous of others’ goods. As ρi tends toward unity, it becomes more 
content with its own good. We believe this measure offers a useful way to capture the 
concept of “revisionism,”4 with larger ρi values indicating less revisionism. Interna­
tional relations theorists such as Morgenthau (1948), Kissinger (1957), and Carr 
(1946) identify revisionist states as those dissatisfied with the status quo, a limited bas­
ket of goods in a model of economic exchange. Schweller and Preiss (1997, 11) 
emphasize that such states are often desirous of greater power, which is usually mea­
sured in terms of material resources. Thus, our measure captures aspects of both unit-
level satisfaction and power. 
Equation (1) can also be interpreted as an Armington aggregator for an economy’s 
productive capacity. Using this interpretation, one can consider the equation as a pro­
duction function, aggregating a potentially diverse resource base into a homogeneous 
final good called national output. If ρi is small, then an economy has strong economies 
of scope and benefits greatly from a diverse resource base. Thus, when a revisionist 
state obtains a diverse basket of goods, it will become substantially more powerful in 
military terms. 
ECONOMIC EXCHANGE5 
A trading network is a collection of sets { }m 
=1 that cover M. Each  Si is the list of Si i  
trading partners of the ith state. Because this collection covers the index set of states, 
m 
M⊆ Si . This collection of sets must satisfy two consistency properties. First, i∈ Si 
i=1 
because every state is its own trading partner. Second, if j∈ Si, then it must be the case 
4. Economists identify ρi as an elasticity parameter. When ρi is near unity, goods are almost perfect 
substitutes, and the desire for variety is attenuated. 
5. The model of economic exchange draws heavily on the excellent work of Jodhimani (1999). 
that i ∈ Sj. For example, if{ }m {{1}, . . . ,{m}}, then all the states in the world are in Si i=1 = 
autarky, or if{ }m = {M, . . . ,M}, then the world economy is completely integrated. S i i=1 
Trading with another state requires paying fixed costs that depend on the current 
(and thus time-dependent) economic distance between trading partners. Consider a 
symmetric m × m matrix, 
� a t( )  �  0 1 j  � � a t( ) im A t( )  = ,a t1( )  � � j  
� � a t( )  0 mj  
whose canonical element 0 ≤ aij(t) measures the economic distance between states i 
and j at time t. This matrix has two simple properties. First, the distance from a state to 
itself is zero. Second, the distance from i to j is the same as the distance from j to i.6 
We follow the tradition in the literatures on international trade and economic geog­
raphy, imposing that economic distance is the fraction of resources that a state pays to 
maintain its commercial relations with any trading partner. It is useful to define a trade 
indicator function: 
1 if j ∈S iχ ij( )t = 0 otherwise. 
This function simply tracks who is trading with whom; it takes the value of unity if 
states i and j are trading partners and zero otherwise. 
Now let the initial economic geography A(0) be given. We assume that economic 
distance evolves according to 
aij(t + 1) =  aij(t) exp (–δχij (t) –  θ), (2) 
where δ is the parameter that captures the rate at which trading costs decrease if a trad­
ing link between state i and state j is extant. The parameter θ is the exogenous rate at 
which the economic geography becomes more compact in every period. Thus, the eco­
nomic distance between two states shrinks as long as the trading links between them 
have not been severed, and it may also shrink if there is exogenous technological prog­
ress that makes trade between all countries easier. Also, in the spirit of the strong sym­
metry of the model, this learning-by-trading parameter δ applies to every link equally. 
6. We do not impose the triangle inequality a priori in this matrix because these numbers describe 
economic distance, not spatial geography. For example, it is entirely plausible that the economic distance 
between Cuba and the United States is greater than the sum of the economic distances from Cuba to Mexico 
and then from Mexico to the United States. 
m 
j 1 
is described by exp[–ai(t)]. Because this fixed cost is a fraction of state i’s endowment, 
∑
=
χ ijLet ai(t) =  ( )t a t( ). Then the real cost that state i pays to maintain its trading links ij 
its net endowment available for trade is ~ i
aspect of this formulation is that bilateral trade costs become lower if countries estab­
lish a link, and they do not return to higher levels if that link is temporarily abandoned. 
The economic equilibrium in the world economy is a “price vector,” p = (p1, . . . ,pm), 
ω (t) = exp[–ai(t)]ωi(t). The most important 
mand corresponding list of allocations, x such that each state maximizes utility, { }x i i  = 1 
taking its own terms of trade, the current economic geography, and the trading struc­
ture as given. Also, the obvious materials balances condition holds; thus, demand for 
any one good does not exceed its supply. The phrase “price vector” is in quotes because 
it is not necessarily true that every state trades for every good. These numbers do not 
= 
describe the marginal rates of substitution between pairs of commodities for represen­
tative agents in the world economy. Instead, they are more akin to state-specific terms 
of trade. Recall that Si is the list of trading partners for the ith state; its terms of trade are 
~ 7�the vector = ( )p p p .∈i j i j S i 
ω~It is convenient to write yi(t) =  pi i(t). Then the demand of the ith state for the jth 
good is 
∑
∈ i 
−1 
j S  
0 otherwise 
 ∈Si ri j riy t p  ( )  if  jp 
= 
i j 
x t( )ij , 
ρi /(ρi – 1).8 Thus, only a state’s terms of trade matter in describing its pattern where ri =
m m 
ω∑
=
∑
=
~
i 1 i 1 
≤ 0 ∈ Rm. In other words, at the current terms of trade, the demand for each country’s 
resources does not exceed its supply, even after the fixed costs of maintaining the trad­
ing network have been paid. 
CONFLICT AND MILITARY CONQUEST 
The economic equilibrium is only half the picture. The second part of the model 
consists of an explicit description of conflict and possible war.9 The essence of this 
process is captured by a simple parable. Consider a bully trying to extort your lunch 
money. The bully can observe many relevant characteristics: your height, your weight, 
and your degree of fitness, among other things. But he cannot observe your resolve for 
7. Calculating these terms of trade for an arbitrary description of the trading network is the most time-
consuming part of the computer simulations. We used a fixed-point algorithm extending Judd (1998, 188). 
8. If we think of equation (1) as an Armington aggregator, then these are the derived demands for 
intermediate inputs necessary to produce a homogeneous final good called national output. 
9. There are many different theories explaining the outbreak of war, and the idea behind this model is 
as old as the Melian dialog of Thucydides. We are very grateful to a referee who suggested that we develop a 
model of war as a breakdown in interstate bargaining owing to private or incomplete information. 
of demand, and the usual materials balances condition can be written as x i – i 
self-defense. The bully is rational, recognizing that an actual fight will entail costs for 
both parties. So he tries to decide just how far to push. The bully has prior beliefs about 
how spunky you are, and if he thinks there is a high likelihood that you are tough, then 
he will extort little or nothing. Both weak and strong defenders will acquiesce if the 
demand is not very onerous to avoid the costs of actual physical conflict. But if the 
bully thinks there is little likelihood that you are tough, then he will ask for more 
money, just enough so that weak types—perhaps a large majority of the population— 
will not be willing to fight. In this case, he will get a decent amount of money most of 
the time, but every now and again, he will have to fight a spunky defender. In those situ­
ations, he will often lose the fight. The rest of this subsection will make this model 
explicit. 
Consider an extant trading network with corresponding equilibrium allocations 
x = x i i
m 
=1 . Each state’s economic power is given by its gross national product ui(x{ }  i). A 
rich group of trading partners bolsters the economic and thus the military power of a 
state.10 It also gives revisionism analytical bite because a state with a low ρi will have 
disproportionate military power if it manages to secure a diverse pattern of trade. 
Write ui = ui(xi) and uj = uj(xj), and consider a simple function: 
ui (3)( , = ,w u u )i j ~ 
u + Φui j 
~ 
where Φ is a (systemic) random defense parameter.11 This random variable is how we 
~ introduce different types of defenders into this model. Given a realization of Φ, this 
function describes the probability that an attack by state i against state jwill succeed. It 
is customary to model different types of belligerents by assuming that states have dif­
ferent costs of going to war. Instead, we model different types by the effectiveness of 
their defensive capabilities. An attacker has to be concerned about meeting a tough 
~ defender, so we can think about a high realization of Φ as a low cost of defense. The 
actual realization of this random variable is not observable, so any potential attacker 
has to make an ex ante decision based on the known distribution of the costs of defense. 
Each state’s gross national product enters equation (3) in a natural way. In particu­
lar, an economically large state attacking a smaller one has a high probability of win­
ning a war. Of course, each of the arguments in this function depends on time. Thus, the 
probability of war may depend on the evolution of economic distance and the value of 
a state’s consumption pattern, determined according to its current terms of trade. It 
also depends on whether the defending state is strong and thus has a large realization of
~ ~ Φ. We assume that Φ is a binomial (and thus the simplest possible) random variable, 
and we write 1 ≤ ϕ0 < ϕ1 as the two elements of its support. Even a weak defender 
does not have a disadvantage, and a strong defender can have a substantial defensive 
advantage. 
10. This specification underlies realist arguments about “relative gains” and the potential pitfalls of 
engaging in international trade. See Grieco (1988, 1990), and Mastanduno (1991). 
11. The analytical form in equation (3) is a special case of the contest success function described by 
Hirshleifer (1995). 
The decision to go to war is made unilaterally by the attacking state i. This assump­
tion stands in sharp contrast with the decision to alter a trading link, which depends on 
a bilateral Pareto improvement for the two states concerned. If war does occur, it has a 
random outcome. If the attacker wins, then it achieves utility 
ui[exp(–aij(t))(xi + (1 –  σ)xj)], 
where 0 < σ < 1 is a (systemic) parameter that captures the subsistence level for each 
state. Three comments are in order. First, the cost of going to war is that the attacker 
must pay a fraction 1 – exp(–aij(t)) of its resources, including its potential booty. Sec­
ond, although economic geography does not enter explicitly into the technology of war 
as summarized by the attack function, it does enter into the calculation of the spoils of 
war. In particular, if two states are far apart, then it costs the attacker a lot to wage war. 
Also, the attacker reaps relatively small benefits from usurping the losing defender’s 
net trades. Third, the benefits from winning an attack are myopic; they are a one-time 
gain that depends on the richness of the defender’s trading pattern. If the attacker loses, 
then it has utility ui[exp(–aij(t))σxi]; it uses up all but a subsistence level of its remain­
ing resources in a futile attack. Also, we impose that the losing attacker has a perma­
nently lower endowment σωi. 
If the defender loses, it achieves utility ui(σxj), and its endowment remains perma­
nently lower at σωi. On the other hand, if the defender wins, then its utility remains 
unchanged at uj(xj), and its endowment is also unchanged. Any country—attacker or 
defender—that loses a war will have an endowment at a subsistence level, and such an 
endowment precludes the possibility that it will be an attacker in the future. Thus, war 
is a permanently destructive activity for the world economy. 
Knowing the nature of war, the attacking state makes a threat, called euphemisti­
ui
cally a demand for additional resources. Let π(ϕ) =  ui + ϕu j be the probability that an 
attacker wins against a defender of type ϕ; we have suppressed the other arguments, all 
of which are publicly observable economic variables, for notational convenience. 
Notice that a risk-neutral defender of type ϕ will acquiesce in a demand not greater 
than π(ϕ)(1 – σ)xj, the expected loss from fighting a war. Thus, a defender will give up 
a large fraction of its resources if it is not likely to win or if war is Draconian. Also, 
tough defenders give up less, because π(ϕ1) <  π(ϕ0) and the odds of beating a tough 
defender are smaller. 
Now what is the optimal threat for an attacker to make? What is the largest resource 
concession that an attacker will demand? If the attacker actually goes to war against a 
defender of type ϕ, it will receive expected utility 
vi(ϕ) =  π(ϕ)ui[exp(–aij(t))(xi + (1 –  σ)xj)] + [1 –  π(ϕ)]ui[exp(–aij(t)σxi)]. 
There are three possibilities. First, an attacker will never actually go to war if it 
demands only π(ϕ1)(1 – σ)xj; think of this threat as asking for a nickel-and-dime con­
cession. Second, it will end up going to war against only tough defenders if it demands 
π(ϕ0)(1 – σ)xj, representing a more hefty concession. Third, it will surely go to war if it 
demands any more than that. 
Let 0 ≤ cj ≤ 1 be the demand for current resources that the attacker puts on the table; 
it is convenient to express this demand as a fraction of the defender’s allocation xj. 
Assume also that a proportion 0 < µ < 1 of the defenders are weak. Then the attacker’s 
expected utility is 
 u x  if c  ( )  (1 − σ) = 0 (4)i i j  t 0 < c 1 − ≤  ) (ϕ1 )u (exp(−a ( ))( x + c x  )) if ( σ π i  ij  i j j  j
z c  =( )i j  µu (exp(−a ( ))( x + c x  )) 1 µ v ( )  if π( )  < ct + −  ) ϕ( ϕ (1 − σ j ) ≤ π(ϕ0 ) i  ij  i j j  i  1 1 j  µ ϕ  1 ) (  v vi( )0 ( µ ϕ  i 1 ) otherwise.+ −  
The first branch of equation (4) corresponds to making no demands and maintaining 
the status quo ex ante. The second branch is the sure utility of making only a nickel­
and-dime demand. The third branch is the expected utility of making a large enough 
demand so that one might have to fight a strong defender. And the fourth branch is the 
expected utility of going to war for sure. The argument that maximizes (4) is the opti­
mal demand. A war occurs only if the attacker demands a large concession and meets a 
tough defender by chance. 
How does a demand for resources (namely, a threat cj > 0) and the possible outbreak 
of war affect the trading network? In the event of any threat at time t, we impose that 
χij(t + 1) = 0 and  χji(t + 1) = 0. If war does break out, then either the attacker or the 
defender loses. Hence, one of these two states will have a subsistence endowment per­
manently. Having such an endowment makes it impossible ever to be an attacker again, 
and it often precludes any future trade. Indeed, the only way that such a state can afford 
to pay the fixed cost of maintaining its trading links is if the economic geography has 
already evolved so that the economic distance to its nearest neighbor is sufficiently 
small. 
This description of threats and the outcome of war assumes that third parties in the 
world economy are neutral, an assumption that could be relaxed in a more complex 
model. In particular, in any period when there is a war, both states i and j consider their 
trades with third parties as given. Still, third parties will be affected deleteriously in the 
next period in the case of war because the aggregate resources in the world economy 
become lower, no matter who wins. This specification of war’s outcome is Draconian, 
but it has the virtue of analytical simplicity. It is also consistent with Liberman’s (1996) 
finding that only the most ruthless conquerors can extract a large net economic surplus 
from the states they vanquish. 
TIMING OF DECISIONS 
The world economy starts out initially in autarky and a state of peace. The eco­
nomic geography and the initial distribution of resources are taken as given. In each 
period, two states are chosen randomly, and the pair considers changing the current 
trading network. They can create a new trading link or sever one if they are currently 
trading partners. If, after paying the fixed cost of creating the new link, the two states 
experience a strict Pareto improvement, then the new network becomes a possibility 
for next period’s status quo. Or, if after saving the fixed costs of the current link and 
foregoing the increased diversity in consumption that it entails, both states are strictly 
better off, then a new (less expansive) trading network becomes the possible future sta­
tus quo. Otherwise, the current network remains unchanged. Both these decisions are 
myopic and ignore the effects that they have on third parties. But they are based on the 
equilibrium terms of trade that occur if the new link is established or if an old one is 
severed. 
Let Ξ(t) be the symmetric m ×m matrix whose canonical element is χij(t); the initial 
trading pattern is given by Ξ(0) = I. Let the current equilibrium allocations be { }mx i i=1 
mand those that would occur if the trading pattern were changed be {~ x i i} =1 . Recall that 
both these allocations depend on the disparate prices and concomitant fixed costs in 
the two different trading networks. Furthermore, keep the definition of zi(cj) in equa­
tion (4) in mind. Then the evolution of the trading pattern for t ≥ 0 can be stated for­
mally as12 
~ 1 − χ ( )t  if u  (x ~ ) > u (x ),  u (x ) > u (x ),  and max z (c ) ≤ u (x ~ ) (5) 
~ 
ij  i i i i j j  j j  i j i i  
χ (t 1)  χ ij( )t if ui(x ~ ) ≤ i(x )or  u  (x j ) ≤ u (x j )and max  zi c ≤ u xi( )ij + =  i u i j j j i( )   0 otherwise.
Because the argument that maximizes (4) takes into account the possibility of fighting, 
the attacker will only make a demand for a resource concession and risk going to war if 
it is not satisfied with the outcome of the current trading network. Equation (5) 
describes a Markov process defined on the state space consisting of the bilateral trade 
links between all states, including the trivial link between a state and itself. Thus, the 
evolution of the world trading system is summarized by the random sequence 
{ ( )}t ∞ t=0 . The simulations described in the next section are essentially an empirical Ξ
investigation of the behavior of this sequence. 
Thus, the initial economic distances between states and the random process of trade 
and conflict give rise to a dynamical system. The steady state (or cyclical behavior) of 
this system describes the long-run trading network. If the initial economic distance 
between states is large enough and the states’ endowments are roughly symmetric, 
then the unique long-run outcome will be autarky. War against a distant neighbor is too 
costly, and it is also too difficult to set up mutually beneficial trades. On the other hand, 
if some pair of states is sufficiently close, then both war and trade become feasible. 
Also, asymmetric gains from trade—reflected in the terms of trade—or an asymmetric 
distribution of resources may make some states temporarily powerful. This imbalance 
of power will have random effects on the outbreak of war and the subsequent distribu­
tion of resources in the world economy. 
12. Please remember that χji(t) =  χij(t), too. 
ANALYTICAL ASPECTS OF THE MODEL 
Consider a state with net endowment ω~ i ( )t and trading partners Si. If its terms of 
i
~ ritrade are ~ pi , then its indirect utility is Vi(~ pi , yi(t)) = ω~ i ( )t �(∑ i S∈ p )1 r . Here we ii 
~have used the fact that a state’s income is yi(t) =  pi ω i ( )t . A state’s welfare is directly 
related to its endowment after paying the fixed cost for its trading network. Also, an 
increase in ~ p j for j ∈ (Si – {i}) will decrease a state’s well-being; thus, a worsening in 
the terms of trade has the expected negative effect. Using the materials balances condi­
tion, one can show that an increase in a state’s net endowment worsens its terms of 
trade. Finally, it is easy to check that such an increase raises a state’s welfare, in spite of 
the terms-of-trade effect. 
Revisionism plays an important role. In particular, a state with a high degree of revi­
sionism (a relatively low value of ρi) will become militarily powerful if it achieves a 
diverse resource base. Consider two states forming an isolated trading group, one with 
ρi = .2 and the other with ρj = .4. If their endowments satisfy ωi = ωj = 2 and the eco­
nomic distance between them is aij(t) = 0, then they will find economic exchange mutu­
ally beneficial. The equilibrium allocations will be xi = xj = (1,1)′. But then the gross 
national product (measured as the utility level) of the revisionist state will be 32 = (1.2 + 
1.2)5, whereas that of its trading partner will be 4 2  = (1.4 + 1.4)2.5, a much smaller num­
ber. In autarky, each state had a gross national product of 2, but trade and the concomi­
tant access to a diverse resource base make the revisionist state much richer and thus 
stronger militarily. 
Let ai(t) = minjaij(t) and ai(t) = maxjaij(t) be the economic distances to the nearest 
state and the farthest state respectively from state i at time t. These are two important 
determinants of trade relations or military conflict. First, notice that if ai(t) is suffi­
ciently large, then state i will neither trade nor enter into conflict with any other state. It 
will not trade because the increased diversity in consumption is not worth the large cost 
of setting up bilateral economic relations. And it will not go to war because equation 
(4) shows that the expected utility of attacking will never be as large as the utility of 
autarky, no matter how rich the defending state’s trading pattern might be. Thus, the 
model is only interesting if the economic distance becomes sufficiently small such that 
at least one state is willing to trade with another. Second, if ai(t) is sufficiently small, 
then state i will be willing to trade with every other state, because the fixed cost of set­
ting up bilateral exchange is small for every partner. Also, equation (4) shows that state 
i may go to war, especially if it can attack a relatively weak state that has an attractive 
array of current resources. 
What determines whether a state trades or goes to war in this model? It is worth 
examining equation (4) in detail to answer this question. First consider two states that 
are equal in every way. Thus, ρi = ρj and xi = xj, and these two states have the same trad­
ing partners, the same sized net endowments, and face the same terms of trade. To 
make things very simple, assume that transportation costs are negligible and that war is 
very Draconian (σ = 0). 
If 1 <  ϕ0 = ϕ1 ≡ ϕ, the defender’s type is known with certainty. Going to war against 
an equally sized neighbor with a defensive advantage is a losing proposition. On the 
other hand, the optimal threat is cj = 1�(1 + ϕ). The defender will acquiesce, and there 
will be a concession that depends naturally on how tough the defender is. There will 
never be war, but there will never be mutually beneficial trade either. Thus, the model 
predicts (random) cycles of resource concessions between equal states in a dyad when 
the economic distance between them is negligible and there are no gains from trade. 
On the other hand, if aij(t) > 0 and the (known) defender is sufficiently tough, then there 
will never be any threats. Again, war does not pay for the attacker, and the optimal 
threat is still cj = 1�(1 + ϕ). But the attacker’s utility of making this threat is ui[exp 
(–aij(t))(xi + cjxj)], whereas that of maintaining the status quo is ui(xi). Because xi = xj, 
we may conclude that the former is less than the latter if (2 + ϕ)�(1 + ϕ) < exp(aij(t)). In 
other words, if the cost of making a threat is just too great, then the dyad maintains the 
status quo and there will be no war. Indeed, the trade link between the two will be 
updated, and they will become closer in an economic geographic sense. 
ANALYTICAL DETERMINANTS OF CONFLICT 
When is war likely? Consider again two identical states located right next to one 
another and assume that ρi = ρj, xi = xj, σ = 0, and  aij(t) = 0. Now also assume that with 
probability ε > 0, the defender is very tough (namely, ϕ1 is unboundedly large); and 
with probability 1 – ε, the defender is weak (and thus ϕ0 ≥ 1 has moderate value). 
Speaking roughly, we can say that the expected utility of going to war against the tough 
type of defender is zero, because the attacker will lose almost surely. But making a 
nickel-and-dime threat is not very attractive, because the probability of actually meet­
ing a tough defender is arbitrarily small. In this case, the optimal threat is cj = 1/(1 + ϕ0) 
> 1�(1 + ϕ1) ≈ 0, and wars will occur with probability ε> 0. If  ε is near 0, then, using the 
same line of reasoning as above, we see that (1 – ε)(2 + ϕ0)�(1 + ϕ0) > exp[aij(t)] = 1. 
Thus, the attacker will find it worthwhile to ask for large resource concessions as long 
as there is only a very small chance of meeting a tough defender. But when war does 
occur, the attacker will almost surely lose. Indeed, it is natural to assume that the weak­
est type of defender has ϕ0 ≈ 1. Then (2 + ϕ0)�(1 + ϕ0) ≈ 3/2; so war between equally 
powerful and geographically proximate states can break out about 1/3 of the time if 2/3 
of the defenders are of the weakest type. 
In fact, we can achieve an even deeper insight. Consider two states that have the 
same set of trading partners and, thus, Si = Sj. In this case, the two states consume the 
same set of goods and, in particular, they are already trading partners. Because prefer­
ences are homothetic, they face the same terms of trade. Thus, their war weights are 
identical to the relative sizes of their gross national products, which depend upon the 
difference in their revisionism parameters. Assume now that the costs of war are slight. 
Then there are three possibilities: (1) the attacker has an overwhelming advantage 
against all type of defenders, (2) the attacker has an advantage against weak defenders 
but not against strong ones, or (3) there is (at most) rough parity between the attacker 
and all types of defenders. 
If the attacker has an overwhelming advantage against all types, it will demand 
large concessions and get them. If the attacker has an advantage only against weak 
defenders, it will still demand large concessions, as long as the share of strong defend­
ers is small enough. In this case, wars will break out sporadically, and the attacker will 
often lose such conflicts. (If the share of strong defenders is large enough, then the 
attacker will make only nickel-and-dime threats and peace will prevail. The small frac­
tion of weak defenders will be free riders.) If there is rough parity between the attacker 
and both types of defenders, then a state will make only nickel-and-dime threats. 
Indeed, even a weak attacker will make these small resource demands, because 
fighting is more costly even for the tough defender than paying nickel-and-dime 
concessions. 
The common intuition behind these results is that the expected gain from resource 
concessions and possible war is not very large if both parties are already consuming 
the same bundle of goods. Also, war will occur only when the attacker demands a large 
trade concession and meets by chance a tough defender. This event will happen only 
when there are few tough defenders. This serves as an important insight: military con­
flict emerges in this model among states that do not have the same trading partners or if 
the share of weak defenders is sufficiently high. So we may conclude that states that 
are treated identically in the world trading system will not attack one another under 
normal circumstances, although they may well demand unilateral resource conces­
sions if the cost of doing so is cheap. War will be avoided, but mutually beneficial 
trades will not occur. 
ANALYTICAL DETERMINANTS OF TRADE 
When is trade likely? First, the gains from trade must be high. The simplest case 
occurs when two states are in autarky and considering setting up bilateral trade. To 
make matters simple, assume that ρi = ρj ≡ ρ and that each state is endowed with two 
units of its idiosyncratic good. Then ui = uj = 2 and the two states are equally powerful. 
Because the two states have equal endowments and preferences are homothetic, then 
the terms of trade will be one to one. After having sunk the fixed costs for setting up the 
link, each state will have utility 21/ρexp(–aij(t)), which is greater than autarkic utility as 
long as aij(t) is not too large. Because 1 ≤ ϕ0 ≤ ϕ1 and the subsistence parameter σ ≥ 0, 
the optimal demand for a resource concession is such that cj ≤ 1�(1 + ϕ0) ≤ 1/2. Fur­
thermore, the expected utility of this concession can be no higher than (2ρ + (cj2)ρ)1/ρ 
exp(–aij(t)) because the attacker might fight and lose. Thus, the attacking country will 
prefer trade as long as 2 > 2ρ + 2ρ – 1, which is true for ρ < .61. These are two fairly weak 
sufficient conditions for symmetric counties to prefer trade to war: economic geo­
graphic proximity and a defensive advantage that is high relative to the attacker’s 
degree of revisionism. 
These observations have important implications for the long-run behavior of the 
world system. The model describes a Markov chain defined on the matrix of trading 
links Ξ(t). Thus, the state space of the model is the set of symmetric m × m matrices 
whose canonical element is zero or unity; the initial state of the system is the m × m 
identity matrix. The long-run behavior of the world trading system is essentially sum­
TABLE 1
 
Baseline Parameter Values
 
Number of states m = 6  
Revisionism ρi = 1/3. i = 1, . . . ,6  
Initial endowments ωi(0) = 1,  i = 1, . . . ,6  
Subsistence level σ = .4  
Share of weak defenders 1 – µ = .72 
Defensive advantage of a weak state ϕ0 = 1  
Defensive advantage of a strong state ϕ1 = 8.14 
Rate of learning by trading δ = .04 
Rate of exogenous technological progress affecting 
economic geography θ = 0  
Share of resources needed to open trade with the nearest neighbor ai(0)�ωi(0) = 0.5, i = 1, . . . ,6  
marized by the absorbing states of the random process of trade or war. Because a state 
that loses a war reverts to subsistence level, it can never attack another state in the 
future. Also, for realistic subsistence levels, it may likely revert to autarky and stay 
there unless there is exogenous technological progress in the economic geographic 
infrastructure. 
We have already seen that perpetual autarky is an absorbing state if the initial eco­
nomic geography is sufficiently disjointed so that neither war nor trade can occur.13 
Likewise, a perpetual random cycle of unilateral demands for small concessions can 
occur in a completely integrated world economy where every state is treated symmet­
rically, although it may not be possible to reach this condition from an initial state of 
autarkic economies. Because the model is highly nonlinear, it is difficult to derive ana­
lytical properties about its long-run behavior. Thus, one can perhaps best understand 
its long-run behavior by repeated simulations for different parameter values. 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
We begin by calibrating the model and specifying different initial economic geo­
graphic configurations for states in the system. We then use repeated replications of the 
model and report the results in four subsections below. The first subsection describes 
the effect of initial economic geography, the second shows how revisionism matters, 
the third looks at the defensive advantage in war, and the fourth examines the effect of 
exogenous technological progress affecting the economic geographic infrastructure. 
The baseline parameters are given in Table 1. Our value for revisionism comes from 
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994), who report that most empirical models of inter­
national trade use an elasticity of substitution 1 ≤ 1/(1 – ρ) ≤ 2 for the Armington 
aggregator. We chose the midpoint of this range as our starting value, giving all states 
13. Indeed, this insight can be generalized; any country that is permanently sufficiently distant from all 
its neighbors will never become a part of the world’s trading system; nor will it ever be involved in war. 
symmetrically ρ = 1/3. The initial endowments were made completely symmetric and 
as simple as possible; it is worth emphasizing that utility is homogeneous of degree 
one in endowments. Thus, doubling a state’s resources doubles its gross domestic 
product at a fixed terms of trade. We employed a simple calculation for the subsistence 
level σ = .4; using data from Maddison (1982), we estimated that German, Austrian, 
Italian, and Japanese production dropped, on average, around 60% from a wartime 
peak to a postwar trough immediately after World War II. 
What is the proportion of weak defenders? Numerous scholars, such as Lake 
(1992), Reiter and Stam (1998), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), have demon­
strated that democracies win a disproportionate share of wars, suggesting that they are 
relatively strong.14 The proportion of nondemocratic states in the international system 
between 1800 and 1994 was roughly 72%, according to the Polity III data set of 
Jaggers and Gurr (1995).15 Thus, we set 1 – µ = .72. The model has two other defense 
parameters: the defensive advantage in war for weak and for strong states. The average 
defensive advantage in war is commonly taken to be three (Mearsheimer 1989). It is 
plausible to assume that weak states have no defensive advantage and thus that ϕ0 = 1.  
The defensive advantage of a strong state can then be identified as ϕ1 = 8.14. 
We select the learning-by-trading parameter using data from Maddison (1982), 
who calculates that the total value of world exports grew at an annual rate of 3.16% 
between 1870 and 1970, a century marked by military conflict. One interpretation is 
that average trading partners became about 3% closer each year after accounting for 
trade disruptions due to war. Because our model allows states to become closer only 
when they are at peace, we adjust the learning-by-trading parameter up to δ = .04. 
Because we wish to focus on the endogenous evolution of trading networks, we begin 
by setting the rate of exogenous technological progress affecting economic geo­
graphic infrastructure θ = 0 for the base runs. Thus, states cannot become closer unless 
they engage in trade. Finally, we set the share of initial resources required to open trade 
with one’s nearest neighbor as ai(0)/ωi = 0.5; Wallis and North (1986) estimate that 
50% of the American economy is devoted to transaction costs. Thus, the ratio ai(0)/ωi = 
0.5 represents the idea that two near neighbors would initially forgo half their autarkic 
resources to form a single (completely) unified economy, as do the constituent regions 
of the United States. 
For all simulations described in this article, we ran the model for a century, stopping 
after 100 periods or when all states had been reduced to subsistence, whichever came 
first.16 Because pairs of states are drawn randomly in each period, we replicate each run 
500 times to ensure that our results are stable. 
14. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for steering us to these authors. 
15. This number is of course sensitive to the exact definition of democracy. We used all country-year 
observations for which there were no missing data and subtracted the autocracy measure from the democ­
racy measure. This yields 13,911 observations on an index ranging from –10 to 10. Following Russett 
(1993), we treat the 9,958 country-year observations in the bottom two-thirds of this range as nondemo­
cratic. We deliberately use a generous definition of democracy to avoid undercounting the number of strong 
states, some of whom may be only semidemocratic. 
16. If a state has a subsistence level of resources, it cannot attack another. We chose to stop after all 
states reached subsistence because we did not want to bias our results in favor of the hypothesis that trade 
occurs simply because every state has lost a war. 
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Figure 1: Initial Economic Geographies 
NOTE: Bold numbers indicate positions of states; italic numbers indicate initial economic distance between 
proximate states. 
We examine a system of m = 6 states, with five different initial economic geogra­
phies. These are a line, a circle, a hub-and-spoke configuration, a globe, and a bimodal 
configuration. Other initial geographies could be specified, but these represent per­
haps the most interesting geometries in two or three dimensions.17 Figure 1 is a picto­
rial representation of initial geographic configurations. The distances have all been 
normalized so that the closest state is only one unit away. The hub-and-spoke configu­
17. We also believe that these geographies offer a rough approximation of various regions of the world. 
The line resembles the distended geography in South and Central America. The circle represents the dis­
tended geography in Africa and continental Asia. The hub and spoke has similarities to certain colonial and 
postcolonial geographies with the metropole as the hub state; it may also resemble the effective geography 
of the “yen bloc” (Frankel 1993) with Japan as the hub state and other East Asian and Pacific states on the 
periphery. The compact economic geography in Western Europe looks more like the globe configuration. 
Finally, the bimodal configuration resembles the cold war situation in which the geography was relatively 
compact within a bloc but extremely distended between the two blocs. 
TABLE 2
 
Summary Statistics
 
Initial 
Geography 
Wars per 
Replication 
Replications Ending 
before 100 Periods (%) 
Trade Links per 
Replication 
Average Correlation 
between Trade and War 
Line 
Circle 
Hub and spoke 
Globe 
Bimodal 
4.99 
5.88 
6.01 
6.04 
2.91 
20.00 
58.00 
69.00 
67.00 
0.40 
1,496 
1,485 
1,680 
1,704 
1,357 
.29 
.07 
–.08 
–.08 
.53 
ration shows that the (arc) distance between two neighbors on the periphery 2π/5 ≈ 
1.26 is greater than the distance from any peripheral state to the hub. 
THE EFFECT OF INITIAL ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 
Table 2 reports summary statistics based for the base cases, including two different 
measures of conflict. The first is the average number of wars occurring per replication; 
it tends not to be greater than six because we halt a run when all six states have lost a 
war and reached subsistence. The second is the percentage of replications ending 
before 100 periods, when all states have been reduced to a subsistence level. Both mea­
sures tell a similar story: the compact configurations (hub-and-spoke and globe) are 
more bellicose than the distended ones, suggesting that economic proximity makes 
military conquest and resource extraction easier to achieve. 
The average number of trade links per replication measures economic activity 
within the system. In a replication lasting 100 periods with six states, there can be a 
maximum of 3,600 trade links if every state traded with every other (including itself) in 
each period. Likewise, the minimal number of trade links is 600. The results show, not 
surprisingly, that economic distance functions as a barrier to trade. The distended 
geographies show fewer trade links than the compact ones. 
After each replication, we also computed the dyadic correlation between war and 
trade.18 The last column in Table 2 shows the average correlation over 500 replications. 
It is important to note that the correlation between war and trade tends to become more 
negative as the initial economic geography becomes more compact. The hub-and­
18. During each replication, we keep track of the bilateral patterns of attacks and trade links 6 × 6 in  
matrices whose canonical element indicates the number of times that state i attacks or trades with state j. Sta­
tistical analyses of trade and war usually do not distinguish between attacking and defending states. So, we 
add j’s attacks on i to i’s attacks on j, yielding 15 dyadic observations of war, after dropping the meaningless 
observations on the main diagonal because state i never attacks itself. Because trade patterns are automati­
cally symmetric, we also have 15 meaningful dyadic observations of trade links. We then compute the corre­
lation between trade and war after each replication. These 500 observations are independent by construc­
tion, because each replication is random. We then compute the average correlation coefficient and check 
whether it is statistically different from zero using the null hypothesis that the correlations are drawn from a 
uniform distribution on [–1, 1]. Under this null hypothesis, the sample mean of these statistics is distributed 
N(0, 1/ 3n ), where n is the sample size. Thus, all these sample means are highly significant. 
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Figure 2: Timing of Conflict 
spoke and globe configurations exhibit a negative correlation, whereas the more dis­
tended line and circle show a positive correlation. The correlation between war and 
trade in the bimodal geography is highly positive. 
The dyadic correlation between trade and war will be a recurring theme of our 
empirical analysis. Thus, it is worth emphasizing the three constituents of this correla­
tion in the model. First, there is a negative short-run correlation between trade and war, 
simply because the dyad severs a trade link when it goes to war. Second, this correla­
tion is inherently biased toward one in the distended configurations because distant 
states can neither trade nor go to war. Third, the model makes it clear that one needs to 
control for the current configuration of trading partners if one wants to reconstruct the 
predicted negative (partial) correlation between trade and war. For simplicity and to 
make our results widely comparable with the current empirical literature, we report 
only the long-run (total) correlation that a statistician would observe in a panel consist­
ing of a century of dyadic data. Finally, we must emphasize that each particular history 
is random. Thus, it is entirely possible for one particular run to get a positive correla­
tion between trade and war in the globe configuration, even though the average of these 
numbers over 500 runs is statistically significantly negative. 
These summary statistics obscure important differences with regards to the timing 
of conflict and the patterns of trade and war within different initial economic geogra­
phies. Figure 2 shows the average number of wars in each period for three configura­
tions. Wars occur at a relatively uniform rate in the somewhat peaceful line configura­
tion. This contrasts with the timing of conflict in the globe, where the early periods are 
marked by heavy conflict, which then tapers off in later periods. The bimodal configu­
ration exhibits little conflict in early periods, and wars tend to occur more frequently in 
later ones. 
State 1’s average number of attacks per State 1’s average number of trade links per 
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Figure 3: Patterns of War and Trade in the Line 
This chronology of conflict occurs in part for the following reasons. In the globe, 
states quickly establish different trading networks, and military conflict with states not 
having the same set of trading partners becomes immediately attractive. This conflict 
tails off as aggressors inevitably lose wars and revert to a subsistence level. In the 
bimodal configuration, symmetric trading networks quickly emerge within each bloc, 
so conflict is less attractive in early periods due to the implicit balance of power. How­
ever, when a unilateral demand for additional resources does occur, trading relation­
ships are cut, creating asymmetric trade patterns and a local imbalance of power. These 
factors make conflict more attractive, and wars become more frequent in later periods. 
Initial economic geography also relates directly to the dyadic patterns of war and 
trade within the system. In the distended line configuration, trade and war fall with ini­
tial economic distance. Indeed, an initial economic distance greater than three acts as 
an effective barrier to any economic exchange or military conquest. For example, nei­
ther state at the ends of the line can reach the three most distant states in the system. 
State 1’s patterns of attack and trade shown in Figure 3 illustrate this fact. 
If a state near the end of the line desires goods produced by states near the other end, 
then it must attack the central states, called state 3 and state 4. Only these states are able 
to trade with those at the opposite end. Hence, they become the most frequent targets of 
attack in this initial geography, being the recipient of 57% of total attacks (versus 33% 
if the attacks were evenly distributed across the six states). Despite these attacks, 
which sever the relevant bilateral trade link, the central states still take part in 39% of 
all trade links in the system. The correlation between war and trade is positive because 
states at one end of the line cannot attack or trade with states at the other end. 
In the circle, each state faces the same initial geography as a central state in the line. 
Thus, given the baseline parameters, a state can potentially reach all other states in the 
system except its opposite. If a state desires the distant good, then it must attack 
another state trading with its opposite number. In fact, all other states can potentially 
trade with their opposite, so the attack pattern becomes relatively uniform across 
reachable states. State 2’s pattern of attacks in Figure 4 illustrates this relationship. 
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Figure 4: Patterns of War and Trade in the Circle 
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Figure 5: Patterns of War and Trade in the Hub and Spoke 
In the more compact hub-and-spoke configuration, each state can potentially reach 
every other. But the configuration is asymmetric because the hub enjoys a maximally 
compact initial geography. On the periphery, trade falls with distance. Figure 5 uses 
state 2 (a peripheral state) as an example again. That state tends to trade as much and 
sometimes more with its peripheral neighbors as it does with the hub. This fact occurs 
because state 1 (the hub) represents a potentially lucrative target for military conquest 
because its central position allows it to trade easily with all other states, giving it a rich  
array of goods for usurpation. Indeed, the hub suffers more than 1/6 of the attacks in the 
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Figure 6: Histogram of Wars in Globe 
system. Due to these frequent attacks, trade with the hub state gets somewhat 
depressed. 
In the compact globe configuration, trade and war both fall with distance. A state 
trades and fights less with its global antipode than with its four closer neighbors. 
Although this configuration exhibits the highest average number of trade links per rep­
lication, the globe—not unlike the hub-and-spoke—is usually quite violent. Figure 6 
shows that the globe system never exhibits fewer than four wars and sometimes seven 
or more. Such a bellicose run can occur when a strong state repeatedly attacks and 
beats a weaker one. 
In contrast, the bimodal configuration is relatively peaceful, as shown in Figure 7. 
Given the high initial economic distance between the two blocs, states are able to trade 
and fight only within their own bloc. Hence, the correlation between trade and war 
becomes strongly positive. The easiest way to explain this correlation is to think of a 
world on the eve of the modern era that consists of England, France, and Germany and 
Korea, Japan, and China. Because the two blocs are so far apart in economic distance, 
there will never be any trade or conflict between members of two different groups; all 
such activity must be local. Indeed, there is much economic activity within each bloc; 
each state has a trade link with its two close neighbors in 63% of the periods. 
THE EFFECT OF REVISIONISM 
Holding all the other baseline parameters constant at their values in Table 1, we var­
ied the states’ levels of revisionism ρ ≡ ρi, i = 1, . . . ,6. Revisionism is a unit-level 
parameter, but consistent with the spirit of strong symmetry in this model, we first 
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Figure 7: Histogram of Wars in Bimodal 
adjust it for all the states in the system. We initially concentrate on the effects of revi­
sionism in the globe, which is the most compact initial configuration. 
Table 3 reports the average number of wars and trade links per replication for each 
symmetric value of the revisionism parameter. It shows that a state’s desire to obtain 
the goods of others motivates both war and trade. When all states have a high level of 
revisionism, there is a very strong incentive to trade, and states with equally diverse 
resource bases are equally powerful. This balance of power acts as a partial deterrent to 
war in the initial stages of the development of the global trading network. The eco­
nomic geography evolves so that the states become closer together, and there is typi­
cally a negative correlation between trade and war. 
However, when .4 ≤ ρ ≤ .5, this usually negative correlation is actually reversed. As 
global revisionism declines, the world becomes more fragmented. Often a state will 
not have the incentive to trade with its antipode. A fragmented trading network tends to 
make the correlation between trade and war positive, because a state will neither trade 
nor go to war with another that is too distant. Eventually, wars dissipate completely 
when states have a revisionism parameter of ρ ≥ .6. States become content with their 
own good, and they neither threaten nor attack their neighbors. Likewise, the world 
economic geography never evolves; in essence, the system remains a completely frag­
mented network of autarkic states. 
Revisionism obviously has important effects on the patterns of war and trade. In a 
global system of highly revisionist actors, a state takes advantage of initial geographic 
proximity to attack its near neighbors at almost twice the rate as its antipode. This local 
conflict disrupts trade patterns with the close neighbors enough so that it actually 
engages in more economic exchange with its antipode, despite the pair’s greater initial 
TABLE 3
 
Revisionism
 
Symmetric Revisionism Asymmetric Revisionism 
ρ Wars Trade Links ρ1 Wars Trade Links 
.1 6.76 1,614 .1 13.80 2,283 
.2 6.07 1,637 .2 6.32 2,003 
.3 5.94 1,753 .3 6.00 1,685 
.4 5.94 1,641 .4 6.03 1,737 
.5 5.77 1,277 .5 5.54 1,874 
.6 0 600 .6 5.26 1,781 
.7 0 600 .7 5.20 1,787 
.8 0 600 .8 5.19 1,787 
.9 0 600 .9 5.25 1,761 
economic distance. In a global system with less revisionist actors, a state finds the ini­
tial distance to its antipode too great to justify military conquest. So it never threatens 
or attacks its antipode, although it has occasional conflict with its closer neighbors. It 
also ceases to trade with its antipode, but it exchanges voluntarily with closer states. 
Thus, at high revisionism, transglobal trade is a frequent occurrence, but economic 
exchange becomes more local with lower revisionism. 
We now examine the effect of asymmetric changes in revisionism. Again using the 
globe configuration, we vary ρ1, leaving ρ ≡ ρi = 1/3,  i = 2, . . . ,6, and all other baseline 
parameters unchanged. The right half of Table 3 shows that a system with one highly 
revisionist actor (ρ1 = .1) is quite bellicose. The revisionist state becomes more power­
ful if it has at least one trading partner and is thus able to prevail in most military con­
tests against third parties. Indeed, it often reduces the other states to a subsistence exis­
tence and then continues to attack the weaker states until it finally loses a military 
contest by chance. Asymmetric changes in revisionism can have an ambiguous effect 
on global trade. Trade exhibits a local modest peak when ρ1 = .5. At this value, the 
moderately revisionist state 1 is still sufficiently motivated to engage in economic 
exchange, but it is rarely worthwhile to attack other states; thus, fewer trade links are 
cut. 
Figure 8 maps the pattern of war and trade in the globe with one highly revisionist 
state in the international system. State 1 attacks all other states more than two times in 
the average replication, accounting for 80% of the conflict in the globe system. The 
revisionist state’s increased power also means that it is almost never a target of aggres­
sion. State 1 trades with each of the other states in roughly half of the periods in an 
average replication. These other, less revisionist states trade among themselves more 
frequently. Thus, economic activity is robust among the more peaceful dyads and cur­
tailed in dyads involving the aggressive revisionist actor. Indeed, the correlation 
between bilateral trade and war is very strongly negative in this case. 
State 1’s average number of attacks State 1’s average number of trade links 
per replication per replication 
2 2 
1 6 
3 
4 
1 6 
3 
4 
2.19 2.20 
2.12 
2.24 
2.22 
48 48 
46 
47 
48 
55 
Figure 8: Patterns of War and Trade in the Globe with Asymmetric Revisionism (�1 = .1) 
When ρ1 = .9, the first state ceases all trade, and the other states now attack the 
weaker state 1. It receives 28% of the attacks versus roughly 17% if all attacks were 
evenly distributed. Indeed, this state becomes isolated in the trading network, and the 
global correlation between trade and war tends to become slightly more positive. This 
phenomenon explains why there is not a substantial diminution in global conflict when 
just one state becomes less revisionist. 
We also studied the effect of revisionism in the hub-and-spoke configuration. 
Changes in systemwide revisionism are similar to those in the globe. The frequency of 
war declines with revisionism, and trade again reaches a peak when ρ = .3. Again, the 
correlation between trade and war may even become positive when systemwide revi­
sionism is lower. In that case, the hub-and-spoke becomes more fragmented, and the 
pattern of attacks changes. As revisionism declines, the hub actually becomes the vic­
tim of an increasing share of attacks. The hub is a lucrative target for a peripheral state 
that cannot trade with other distant states, and modest levels of revisionism mean that 
the hub is not much stronger than a peripheral state with one similar trading partner. 
Asymmetric changes in revisionism in this configuration are perhaps the most 
interesting case of all. We analyzed the natural case, where the hub’s degree of revi­
sionism varies, while holding all the other parameters—including the revisionism of 
all the peripheral states—at the baseline values. When the hub is highly revisionist, 
there is a lot of war and trade. The hub quickly becomes so strong that it is never 
attacked, and it attacks a peripheral state almost any chance it has. Still, there is a lot of 
trade, because the weak peripheral states trade among themselves. There are very few 
wars among the peripheral states because they are often reduced quickly to subsistence 
by the powerful hub. 
The exact opposite happens when the hub has a low degree of revisionism. In partic­
ular, when ρ1 = .9, state 1 remains a weak and isolated state, a hub only in name. State 1 
is attacked very frequently, and the initial hub-and-spoke configuration actually 
becomes almost like the circle with an isolated weak island. Hence, the trade patterns 
among the peripheral states are similar to that in a circle with only five states, and the 
correlation between trade and war is negative largely because every state attacks the 
weak hub, and no one bothers to trade with it. Thus, the correlation between trade and 
war is negative partly because every state attacks the weak and autarkic central state! 
THE EFFECT OF THE DEFENSIVE ADVANTAGE IN WAR 
We performed sensitivity analysis on the defensive advantage in war. Using the 
globe, where conflict tends to be high, we adjusted both defense parameters by the 
same multiple, setting the average defensive advantage at integer values from 1 to 9. 
Greater defensive advantage has the expected effect of reducing conflict in the system. 
A growing defensive advantage in war also serves to increase economic activity 
among states in the globe system. 
This aspect of the model raises an interesting possibility underlying the broad 
expansion of international trade in the latter half of the 20th century. This period saw 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, considered by many to be the ultimate in defen­
sive war technologies. Thus, the rise in economic activity among states with nuclear 
weapons or under the shadow of a nuclear umbrella may be due largely to the relative 
lack of appeal of offensive military options in the nuclear age.19 Hence, actions that 
undermine nuclear deterrence (a ballistic missile defense) or demonstrate the potential 
utility of nuclear weapons in offense (the use of tactical nuclear weapons) may depress 
international economic activity. 
Again using the globe, we also did sensitivity analysis on the variance of defense 
types. Assuming that the average defensive advantage in war is 3, we reduced the dif­
ference between strong and weak types gradually from 7.14 in the base case to 0. When 
there is no difference between strong and weak types, the defender is known with cer­
tainty. The simulation results show that decreased uncertainty about the defender’s 
strength leads to fewer wars but more nickel-and dime demands for resources. Because 
these threats sever the relevant bilateral trade links, more certainty about the 
defender’s strength is also associated with less trading activity. Still, this relationship is 
not monotonic. Intermediate values for this difference actually give rise to the greatest 
number of trading links. This result emerges because there is still some uncertainty 
about the defender’s type, and voluntary exchange is often more worthwhile than 
small nickel-and-dime demands. 
19. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that this logic does not explain why there was an 
expansion of trade among the Western states but not a concurrent East-West trade boom during the cold war. 
Our response is that the economic geography between the Western and Eastern blocs was distended, like our 
bimodal configuration. The Iron Curtain is a good example of how economic and physical geography can be 
quite different. Indeed, there was a “trade” boom within the Eastern bloc during this time, especially because 
an important Soviet war goal had been the destruction of the manufacturing infrastructure of Eastern 
Europe. 
THE EFFECT OF EXOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL 
PROGRESS MAKING TRADE EASIER 
In these final simulations, we examine the effect of technological change on the 
economic geographic infrastructure. It is perhaps appropriate to think of this kind of 
technological progress as exogenous “globalization.” In choosing the baseline param­
eters, we allowed for a pair of states to become 4% closer in each period (δ = .04) only 
if there was an extant trade link between them. Now we allow them to become closer 
both through learning by trading and through exogenous technological progress 
affecting the economic geographic infrastructure. In equation (2), δ and θwork in tan­
dem to reduce the economic distance between states. Because the parameter θ reduces 
this distance even if the pair of states does not engage in trade, two states unable to 
interact in early periods may become sufficiently close to engage in war or trade in 
later periods. 
We want to remain consistent with the historical evidence from Maddison (1982), 
so we consider five combinations such that δ + θ = .04 and hold all other baseline 
parameters constant. We let θ∈ {0,.01,.02,.03,.04}. The first case is the original base­
line; states can become closer only through trade. The fifth posits that all states become 
4% closer in each period, whether or not they engage in trade. The bimodal initial eco­
nomic geography represents an interesting choice for this analysis because it contains 
two distinct blocs unable to interact unless exogenous technological progress shortens 
the initial geography between distant states. 
Technological advances shortening the economic distance between all states not 
only leads to increased trade but also facilitates war as the two blocs become suffi­
ciently close to engage in economic exchange and military conquest. The frequency of 
wars doubles, but trade links only rise by about 25%. Exogenous technological change 
also has important effects on the timing of conflict in the international system. When 
θ = .01, the bimodal geography shows little conflict in early periods, then a steady 
increase in conflict beginning about the 50th period as the blocs become close enough 
to make military conquest across the system a potentially profitable endeavor. When 
θ = .04, the rise in conflict occurs much earlier. Recall that with no exogenous techno­
logical change, this configuration was fairly peaceful. But with high technological 
change, 65% of the replications in this initial geography now end with all states at the 
subsistence level. 
In short, globalization makes the initial geography of the international system less 
important. This kind of change allows different initial geographies to evolve toward a 
common configuration where all states effectively occupy the same point in space and 
there is no economic distance between any pair. This compactness can produce trade; 
it can also facilitate military conquest. 
CONCLUSION 
We began this article by asking, What is the relationship between international 
trade and war? To explore this question, we developed an agent-based computer model 
in which economic exchange and military conflict were emergent processes within a 
system of states motivated to increase their resources and power. Our simulation 
results show that the relationship between trade and war is highly conditioned on third 
factors, such as unit-level revisionism and the initial economic geography of the sys­
tem. An inverse relationship between trade and war emerges from compact economic 
geographies with highly revisionist states. 
Most of the statistical work on trade and war has utilized a limited sample of cases20 
often focusing on “politically relevant dyads,” defined as pairs of contiguous states or 
pairs of states including a major power. With some exceptions, these studies tend to 
show an inverse relationship between dyadic trade and war, consistent with the liberal 
hypothesis. Our results do not contradict these findings, but they do suggest the need to 
think further about sample selection and control variables. 
Lemke and Reed (2001) recently showed that although the focus on politically rele­
vant dyads may introduce some selection bias, it does not substantively affect the sta­
tistical estimates. Nonetheless, enlarging the sample to include all dyads with avail­
able data, thus including more distended state pairs, does weaken the estimated inverse 
relationship between trade and war as Oneal and Russett (1999, 431) show. These 
scholars also demonstrate that a strong inverse relationship reemerges after controlling 
for both the distance between a pair of states and their contiguity (ibid., 433).21 
The statistical effect of their distance variable further demonstrates the importance 
of economic geography. We note, however, that economic geography includes not 
only the physical distance between two states but also the technology and economic 
infrastructure linking them. Thus, although further apart in distance, the United States 
and the United Kingdom may be “closer” than Chile and Argentina, for example. Like­
wise, although geographically proximate, the two Germanys were economically “dis­
tant” during the cold war as the roads and railways connecting the two states were 
blocked and even dismantled. 
In future studies, we urge scholars to broaden their sample to include noncontigu­
ous states that are part of the same trading networks. Of course, geographically sepa­
rated states engage in trade, and many economic blocs include states without common 
borders.22 Furthermore, distant states do engage in some military conflict and even 
major war.23 We also encourage scholars to take greater account of the evolving eco­
nomic geography between states, including technological innovations that make trade 
20. See Barbieri and Schneider (1999, 395) for a concise summary of the statistical work on trade and 
war. 
21. See also the reprinted table in the Journal of Peace Research 36 (1999): 626. It is important to con­
sider what a contiguity term really measures when a distance variable is added to the equation. Lemke and 
Reed (2001, 141) argued that a control variable for “contiguity within a relevant dyad data set might inadver­
tently be a control for joint-minor-power status.” If such minor power pairs compete with each other for 
regional primacy and power, then a contiguity term may be picking up on the more revisionist tendencies 
within these dyads, especially when looking at all dyads and controlling for distance. 
22. There are numerous such examples: Austria and Ireland in the European Union, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Nigeria in the Economic Community of West African States, and Brazil and Chile (associate member) in the 
Southern Cone Common Market. 
23. Lemke and Reed (2001) identified 301 militarized interstate disputes among politically “irrele­
vant” dyads, including 34 such disputes coded as wars. 
or war easier. Scholars should also model the differing revisionist tendencies of states 
in the international system. Revisionism, which motivates both economic exchange 
and military conquest, is not directly measured in any recent analysis of international 
trade and war. 
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